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Legislative Control Over the Coastal
Resources Management Council After
Separation of Powers: Grasping at
Thin Air(, Land, and Water)
Thomas R. Bender*
In his first inaugural address, Abraham Lincoln
acknowledged a fundamental aspect of American government - if
the people grow "weary of the existing government" they have the
option to "exercise their constitutional rights of amending it."
State governments are formed and defined by a constitution, an
instrument "aptly termed a legislative act by the people
themselves in their sovereign capacity. '2 And "in their hands it is
as clay in the hands of a potter: they have the right to mold, to
preserve, to improve and to refine, and finish it as they please. '3
INTRODUCTION
In 1854 the Rhode Island Supreme Court described the
* B.A., University of Rhode Island, 1979; J.D., Washington and Lee
University School of Law, 1982. Mr. Bender is a partner in the firm of
Hanson Curran LLP in Providence, R.I. where he practices appellate
litigation. My thanks to Sharon Atkinson, Juris Doctor Candidate, May
2007, Roger Williams University School of Law, for her significant
contribution of research, insight, and enthusiasm.
1. Christian G. Fritz, Fallacies of American Constitutionalism, 35
RUTGERS, L.J. 1327, 1344 (2004) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural
Address - Final (Mar. 4, 1981), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)).
2. Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 77 A. 145, 154 (R.I. 1910).
3. Gordon S. Wood, Foreward: State Constitution-Making in the
American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 918 (1993) [hereinafter State
Constitution-Making], (quoting James Wilson, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 304 (Robert G. McClosky ed. 1967)).
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separation of powers clause of the state constitution as "the great
principle of American liberty," and recognized that "[t]he rights,
property, and the liberties of the people [ ] depend upon the due
observance of each department of the constitutional limitations
and restrictions upon its authority. '4  In 1999, however,
notwithstanding the state constitution's explicit distribution of
power into legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and
the vesting of the governor with the executive power, a majority of
the justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court joined an
important advisory opinion. 5 The justices concluded that the
Rhode Island General Assembly had exercised substantial
executive functions throughout the state's constitutional history.6
Specifically, the justices found that, historically, the General
Assembly had participated in a long-standing practice of making
appointments to, and seating themselves on, boards, commissions,
and other state entities exercising executive power. 7
The 1986 Constitutional Convention re-adopted the state
constitution's reserved powers clause, which read: "[t]he general
assembly shall continue to exercise the powers it has heretofore
exercised, unless prohibited in this constitution. '8 The justices
reasoned that this clause implicitly affirmed the General
Assembly's historic exercise of these executive functions as
constitutionally permissible. 9  Anticipating the controversy to
which this opinion might give rise, however, the justices noted
that if the historical practice was deemed undesirable, the state
constitution would have to be amended. 10 And that is exactly
what happened. By an overwhelming electoral majority, Rhode
Island voters, in 2004, enacted four separate constitutional
amendments to halt the legislative exercise of executive power. I I
The first and perhaps most significant amendment was the
4. In re Dorr, 3 R.I. 299, 301 (1854).
5. See generally In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (R.I. Ethics
Comm'n - Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1999).
6. Id.
7. See id. at 64-65.
8. Id. at 63 (citing R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 10).
9. Id.
10. See id. at 72.
11. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. III, § 6 (amended 2004); id. at art. V; id. at
art. VI, § 10 (repealed 2004); id. at art. IX (amended 2004).
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repeal of the reserved powers clause. 12 The reserved powers
clause was the basis for affirming the constitutional exercise of
executive power by the legislature. Thus, this amendment served
as a very distinct signal that the General Assembly's past
historical practices would no longer have any constitutional
import. 13
The second change was to the distribution of powers clause.
The distribution of powers clause was amended to distribute the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers into "three separate and
distinct departments" rather than the former, less precise
distribution "into three departments."' 4 This change emphasized
that the legislative and executive powers are not only assigned to
separate departments, but their exercise is limited to those
departments as well.
The third amendment explicitly prohibited elected members
of the General Assembly from serving on state entities exercising
executive power. 15 Last, and certainly not least, the governor was
given the constitutional power to appoint all members of state
entities exercising executive power. 16  This final amendment
served as an unmistakable indication that manning such entities
is now deemed to be a core executive function under the state
constitution. 17
Notwithstanding the 2004 amendments, however, this new
constitutional scheme has not yet been applied to the Coastal
Resources Management Council (hereinafter CRMC).18 The
CRMC is an independent regulatory agency charged with
exercising executive power. 19 Specifically, the CRMC implements,
enforces, and executes the laws pertaining to the state's coastal
resources. On the last day of the Rhode Island General Assembly's
2006 session, legislation was proposed in the House of
Representatives that would continue to permit legislators to sit
12. See R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (repealed 2004).
13. See id.
14. Id. at art. V (amended 2004).
15. See id. at art. III, § 6.
16. See id. at art. IX, § 5.
17. See id.
18. See H.R. 8170 120th Gen. Asssem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2006) (proposed).
19. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-1(i) (1996 Reenactment); Sartor v.
Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 542 A.2d 1077, 1078 (R.I. 1988).
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on, and appoint members to, the CRMC. 20
At the same time this legislation was proposed, the House of
Representatives passed a resolution seeking an advisory opinion
from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, asking four questions
concerning the constitutionality of the proposed legislation in light
of the 2004 amendments. Specifically referencing the third clause
of section 17 of the "Declaration of Certain Rights and Principles,"
the House's resolution suggested that this clause gives the
General Assembly exclusive governmental authority over
environmental matters,2 1 and intimated that this clause places
combined legislative and executive authority in the general
assembly with respect to environmental issues.22 In essence, the
resolution suggested that the House of Representatives
anticipates that the Rhode Island Supreme Court will agree that a
single clause of article I, section 17 is a "mini" reserved powers
clause for environmental matters.23 The House expects the court
to conclude that the fundamental constitutional principles of
separation of powers, so overwhelmingly embraced by the voters
in 2004, was not intended to apply to state governmental action
with respect to the environment. 24  That legislative reach,
however, exceeds its grasp.
Although the CRMC exercises powers resembling legislative
and judicial functions, they are only quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial in nature. These powers therefore do not constitute the
constitutional exercise of legislative or judicial power. The only
constitutional power an administrative entity such as the CRMC
can exercise is executive power. 25  Consequently, the 2004
amendments unmistakably prohibit legislators from serving as
members of the CRMC, and unmistakably give the governor the
20. See H.R. Res. 8290, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2006).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Galbraith v. Lenape Reg'l High Sch., 964 F. Supp. 889, 894
(D.N.J. 2004) (citations omitted); Mich. Chiropractic Council v. Comm'r of the
Office of Fin. and Ins. Servs., 716 N.W.3d 561, 567 (Mich. 2006) (citations
omitted); City of Hackensack v. Winner, 410 A.2d 1146, 1159 (N.J. 1980); Vt.
Dep't. of Taxes v. Tri-State Indus. Laundries, Inc., 415 A.2d 216, 218 (Vt.
1980) (citations omitted).
25. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. III, § 6 (amended 2004); id. at art. VI, §10
(repealed 2004); id. at art. IX, § 5 (amended 2004).
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constitutional power to appoint its members.26 Clause 3 of section
17 cannot, and does not, trump the design and distribution of
power established by the 2004 amendments. 27 In fact, clause 3 is
a limitation on the only governmental power possessed by the
legislative branch - the power to enact legislation - and not an
extraordinary grant of combined legislative and executive power.
The plain import of clause 3 is to impose a duty upon the General
Assembly to enact a specific type of environmental legislation -
legislation that preserves and protects the state's natural
resources. Nothing in section 17 remotely suggests any intent to
empower the General Assembly to exercise the executive authority
to implement and administer environmental legislation it
enacts.28
The request for an advisory opinion, however, goes beyond the
issues specifically related to the CRMC. It also raises a significant
issue with respect to control over the pace and timing of
implementing the 2004 amendments throughout state
government. In its resolution, the House of Representatives also
sought advice from the justices as to whether the governor's new
appointment power was self-executing. 29 The House sought to
discover whether the governor's power was immediately vested in
that office upon passage of the amendment, or whether the
General Assembly must enact implementing legislation before the
governor is permitted to exercise it.30 Given the two-year delay to
date, and the struggle over the CRMC, the House of
Representatives' apparent position is that the appointment power
must remain dormant unless and until the General Assembly
enacts appropriate implementing legislation. 31  That view,
however, is at odds with the modern constitutional view that holds
a strong presumption in favor of self-executing constitutional
provisions that are immediately executable - a presumption that
exists precisely to prevent legislative control over when a power
26. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
27. See id.
28. See H.R. Res. 8290, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2006).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Morgan v. Bd. of Sup'rs, 192 P.2d 236, 241 (Ariz. 1948);
Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 658 (Colo. 2004); Gray v. Bryant, 125
So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960); Ohio ex rel. Russell v. Bliss, 101 N.E.2d 289, 291
(Ohio 1951); Beatty v. Wittekamp, 172 S.E. 122, 125 (S.C. 1933).
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may be exercised, and prevents the will of the people from being
frustrated by legislative inactivity.32
Certainly the General Assembly may enact legislation
imposing conditions on the governor's appointment power, subject
to judicial review concerning the appropriate constitutional limits
on any such conditions. It does not follow, however, that the
governor's exercise of the appointment power must await such
legislation. The amendment places only two limitations on the
governor's appointment power. First, the appointments are
subject to the advice and consent of the senate.33 Second, the
power applies only to boards, commissions, or agencies that
exercise executive power. 34  Submitting appointments to the
advice and consent of the Senate plainly requires no legislation to
implement. While the power is limited to boards, commissions, or
agencies that exercise "executive power," the concept of executive
power is a constitutionally sufficient principle to guide the
exercise of the governor's appointive power. If a dispute between
the legislative and the executive branches arises over whether a
particular entity exercises "executive power," settling that dispute
would fall to the judicial branch.35
This Article will demonstrate that the governor's appointment
power is self-executing; that the CRMC exercises executive power
in a constitutional sense; and that the governor, therefore, has the
constitutional authority and duty to appoint all members of the
CRMC. Further, this Article will show that article I, section 17 of
the Rhode Island Constitution does not shield the CRMC, or any
other state agency or council dealing with environmental matters
from the impact of the 2004 amendments. Nor does article I,
section 17 alter or affect the governor's appointment power or
permit legislators to sit on the CRMC. To begin, however, it is
necessary to briefly address four basic components to the
questions at hand: (1) article I, section 17, (2) the CRMC, (3) the
2004 constitutional amendments, and (4) the questions submitted
by the House of Representatives to the Rhode Island Supreme
32. See H.R. 8170, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2006) (proposed).
33. See R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (amended 2004).
34. See id. at art. X, § 3 (stating that "[t]he judges of the supreme court
shall give their written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested
by the governor or by either house of the general assembly").
35. Id. at art. I.
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ART. I, SEC. 17 - THE "PRIVILEGES OF THE SHORE" AND PROTECTION OF
THE ENVIRONMENT
Article I of the Rhode Island Constitution sets forth a
"Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and Principles. '36
Along with individual constitutional rights, such as equal
protection of the laws, 37 due process, 38 freedom of religion,39 and
the right to trial by jury,40 Rhode Island citizens enjoy
constitutional rights related to the "privileges of the shore."41
Since the adoption of Rhode Island's first constitution in 1843,
article I, section 17 has provided: "[t]he people shall continue to
enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery, and the
privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore entitled
under the charter and usages of this state. '42  In 1986, the
legislature clarified section 17, to better describe what types of
"privileges of the shore" were constitutionally protected. 43 The
legislature achieved this objective by adding the phrase:
"including but not limited to fishing from the shore, the gathering
of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and passage
along the shore."44 Combining the two parts, the first clause of
article I, section 17 declares:
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all
the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to
which they have been heretofore entitled under the
charter and usages of this state, including but not limited
to fishing from the shore, the gathering of seaweed,
leaving the shore to swim in the sea and passage along
the shore * * *45
36. See id. at art. I, § 2.
37. See id.
38. See id. at art. I, § 3.
39. See id. at art. I, § 15.
40. Id. at art. I, § 17.
41. See id. See also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1842).
42. See COMM. ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES,
CoMM. REPORT ON CONVENTION RESOLUTION 86-00003 (Comm. Print 1986).
43. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (amended 1986).
44. Id.
45. Champlin's Realty Assocs. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1165 n.5 (R.I.
2003).
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court has interpreted clause 1 as
a codification of the common law public trust doctrine, a common
law doctrine in existence at the time the state constitution was
enacted.46 Under the common law, Rhode Island holds title to all
tidal lands in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of the public.47
The state's title, however, is characterized by "two separate yet
tightly woven interests: the jus privatum and the jus publicum.' '48
The jus privatum relates to the state's title to tidal lands, whereas
the jus publicum relates to the public rights to which the state's
title is subject, such as navigation and fishing.49 Thus, the state's
plenary authority over tidal lands is limited by the state's common
law public trust responsibilities, which are now embodied in the
first clause of article I, section 17.50 Consequently, the common
law accounts for the state's title to tidal lands, while clause 1 of
section 17 protects the rights comprising the privileges of the
shore, thereby limiting the manner in which the state may
exercise ownership of tidal lands.51
While clause 1 restricts the exercise of governmental power
with respect to public trust lands, the electorate augmented
section 17 in 1970 to address legislative responsibility with
respect to the whole of the environment generally. 52  The
electorate added a second clause, declaring that all the state's
citizens "shall be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of
the natural resources of the state with due regard for the
preservation of their values." Finally, a third clause was added
that declared:
and it shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide
for the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal,
mineral and other natural resources of the state, and to
46. Id. at 1165 (citing Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d
1255, 1259 (R.I. 1999); Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State,
657 A.2d 1038, 1041 (R.I. 1995)).
47. Id. Tidal land is land lying seaward of the mean high water mark.
Id.
48. Id. at 1666 (citing Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence and
Stonington Steamship Co., 12 R.I. 348, 258 (1879) (Potter, J., concurring)).
49. Id. (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894)).
50. See, e.g., Town of Westerly v. Bradley, 877 A.2d 601, 607 (R.I. 2005);
Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d at 1259.
51. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. I., § 17; Tillison, 823 A.2d at 1166.
52. See R.I. CONST. art. I., § 17 (amended 1970).
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adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect
the natural environment of the people of this state by
providing adequate resource planning for the control and
regulation of the use of the natural resources of the state
and for the preservation, regeneration and restoration of
the natural environment of the state.53
Clause 3 is, in essence, a constitutional environmental
protection amendment. It directs the General Assembly to use its
legislative power to conserve, preserve, protect, regenerate, and
restore the natural environment of the state, by "provid[ing]
adequate resource planning" and "adopt[ing] all means necessary
and proper by law" for those purposes.54 One year after this
mandate was placed in the state constitution, the legislature met
this obligation with respect to a limited, but significant, portion of
the state's natural resources by creating the CRMC, "an
administrative agency, charged with the responsibility of the
preservation, protection, development and, where possible, the
restoration of the state's coastal resources."55
THE COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
The current statutorily required composition of the CRMC
consists of: two members of the House of Representatives
appointed by the speaker, one of whom must represent a coastal
community; two members of the senate appointed by the president
of the senate, each of whom represents a coastal community; two
members of the general public appointed by the speaker; two
members of the public from coastal communities appointed by the
speaker; four members appointed by the governor, all of whom
must be appointed or elected officials of a local government; and
three members of the public from coastal communities appointed
by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. 56 An
appointee may only be removed for just cause, and then only by
the authority making the appointment. 57
By statute, the CRMC's primary responsibility is the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Sartor v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 542 A.2d 1077, 1078 (R.I.
1988); 1970 Pub. Laws ch. 279, §1.
56. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-2(a) (1996 Reenactment).
57. Id. at § 46-23-2.1(d).
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"planning for and management of the resources of the state's
coastal region."58 The coastal region extends from two hundred
feet upland of the mean high water mark, or to that distance
''necessary to carry out effective resources management
programs, '59 to below the mean high water mark "extending out to
the extent of the state's jurisdiction in the territorial sea. '60 In
other words, the CRMC has jurisdiction over public trust tidal
lands plus two hundred feet above mean high tide.
The CRMC is designated by law to be the principle
mechanism for management of the coastal resources in Rhode
Island,61 and is charged with measuring, judging, and regulating
all environmental alterations of coastal resources. 62  It is the
CRMC's primary responsibility to plan and manage coastal
resources by identifying their potential problems as well as uses,
and then create programs to address them.63 Statutory authority
exists64 that enables the CRMC to adopt rules and regulations
consistent with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), to
implement the various management programs it devises, 65 and to
grant permits, licenses and easements.66
To execute and enforce its programs and policies, the CRMC
employs a "commissioner of coastal resources management. '67
The commissioner has the power to order violators to cease and
desist from activities in the state's coastal region.68  The
commissioner has the authority to remedy violations if activities
violate the provisions of Chapter 23 "or any rule, regulation,
assent, order or decision of the counsel. '69 If the violating party
does not remedy its action, or if the violator does not obey the
commissioner's order, either the CRMC's chairperson or the
executive director may assess an administrative penalty in
58. Id. at § 46-23-6(1)(i).
59. Id. at § 46-23-6(2)(iii).
60. Id. at § 46-23-6(2)(ii)(A).
61. Id. at § 46-23-1(c).
62. Id. at § 46-23-1(a).
63. Id. at § 46-23-6(1)(i), (ii).
64. Id. at § 42-35-1 to § 42-35-18.
65. See, e.g., id. at § 46-23-6(2)(i); id. at § 46-23-11.
66. Id. at § 46-23-16.
67. Id. at § 46-23-4.1.
68. Id. at § 46-23-7(a)(1).
69. Id. at § 46-23-7(a)(1).
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accordance with certain statutory guidelines. 70  Additionally,
administrative or judicial proceedings may be instituted to enforce
the CRMC's programs, rules, regulations or orders. 71  All
contested cases are required by statute to be heard before
administrative hearing officers appointed by the governor with the
advice and consent of the senate.72 The hearing officer then
makes proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that are
submitted to the CRMC, which may, with an appropriate written
rationale, adopt, modify, or reject them. 73
In sum, the CRMC is a quintessential independent regulatory
agency. It is "a form of administrative government that is
responsible to regulate human activities and is placed outside any
cabinet department and under the leadership of a college of
commissioners. '74 It is a 'combined-function agency' which makes
the rules, investigates, prosecutes, and adjudicates, '75 all with the
aim of enforcing and thus executing the laws enacted by the
legislature with respect to Rhode Island's coastal resources.
THE 2004 AMENDMENTS
In 2004, the electorate approved several changes to the state
constitution that were specifically designed to alter the existing
distribution of power between Rhode Island's executive and
legislative branches. Although the state constitution has always
commanded that "[t]he powers of government shall be distributed
into three departments: the legislative, executive and judicial, '76
this clause was amended to emphasize that the departments and
their respective powers were to be truly separate and distinct.
Specifically, the clause declared that "[t]he powers of government
shall be distributed into three separate and distinct departments:
the legislative, executive and judicial. '77
Next the state's chief executive received a constitutional
appointment power that the office had not previously possessed.
70. Id. at § 46-23-7.1 to 7.2.
71. Id.
72. Id. at § 46-23-20 to 20.1.
73. Id. at § 46-23-20.4 (1996).
74. Dominique Custos, The Rulemaking Power of Independent Regulatory
Agencies, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 616-17 (Supp. 2006) (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 617 (footnote omitted).
76. R.I. CONST. art. V (amended 2004).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
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The electorate approved article IX, section 5, which provided:
The governor shall, by and with the advice and consent of
the senate, appoint all officers of the state whose
appointment is not herein otherwise provided for and all
members of any board, commission or other state or
quasi-public entity which exercises executive power under
the laws of this state; but the general assembly may by
law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they
deem proper, in the governor, or within their respective
departments in the other general officers, the judiciary or
in the heads of departments. 78
In addition to giving the executive branch the power to
appoint all members of any boards or commissions exercising
"executive power under the laws of this state," or any state or
quasi-public entity exercising such power, the state constitution
was amended further to specifically prohibit any state senator or
representative from sitting as a member of any such entity.79
Article III, section 6 now provides:
No senator or representative shall, during the time for
which he or she was elected, be appointed to any state
office, board, commission or other state or quasi-public
entity exercising executive power under the laws of this
state...
and further that:
No person holding any executive office or serving as a
member of any board, commission or other state or quasi-
public entity exercising executive power under the laws of
this state shall be a member of the senate or house of
78. Id. at art. IX, § 5. Under the Federal Constitution the President
holds a similar appointments power. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2 provides that:
[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appointment Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.
79. R.I. CONST. art. III, § 6.
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representatives during his or her continuance in office. 80
Lastly, in order to emphasize the new constitutional
governmental structure, the reserved powers clause, which
originally provided: "[tihe general assembly shall continue to
exercise the powers it has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited
by this Constitution," was repealed in its entirety.81
QUESTIONS POSED TO THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT
On May 31, 2006, house bill, 06-H 8170, "An Act Relating to
Waters and Navigation - Coastal Resources Management Council"
was introduced and referred to the House Separation of Powers
Committee. 82 If enacted, this bill would have repealed chapter 23
of Title 46, - the chapter creating, organizing and empowering the
CRMC.83 In its place, the bill would have enacted chapter 23.3, a
chapter identical in every respect to the current chapter 23.84 In
the resolution seeking an advisory opinion, the House of
Representatives indicated the proposed legislation was intended
to carry out the General Assembly's duty under clause 3 of article
I, section 17:
to provide for the conservation of the air, land, water,
plant, animal, mineral and other natural resources of the
state, and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law
to protect the natural environment of the people of the
state . . . and for the preservation, regeneration and
restoration of the natural environment of the state.8 5
Notwithstanding the 2004 separation of powers amendments,
house bill 06-H 8170 would continue to permit members of the
80. Id. The corresponding provision in the Federal Constitution provides:
[N]o Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of
the United States, which shall have been created, or the
Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time
and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
81. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (repealed 2004) (emphasis added).
82. H.R. 8170, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2006).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. H.R. 8290, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2006) (quoting R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 17, cl. 3).
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legislature to sit as members of the CRMC, and to divide the
appointment power among the speaker of the house, the president
of the Senate, and the governor.8 6 The House of Representatives
sought the Rhode Island Supreme Court's advice on the
constitutionality of that continued arrangement in light of the
2004 amendments by posing the following three questions:
(1)Would the proposed act, if duly enacted into law, which
permits members of the General Assembly to sit as
members of the Coastal Resources Management Council
(CRMC) . . . violate the constitutional amendment to
Article IX, Section 5, so-called Separation of Powers
Amendment, passed by the electorate on November 2,
2004, which calls into question the constitutionality of the
appointing authority?
(2)Would the proposed act, if duly enacted into law,
permit the Speaker of the House to appoint public
members to the Coastal Resources Management Council
(CRMC)...?
(4)Is the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC)
by its nature, purpose, and operation a legislative
function[?]87
Lastly, the House of Representatives posed a fourth question
not specifically related to the CRMC. 88 This question related
solely to article IX, section 5, the 2004 amendment giving the
governor appointing authority for all state and quasi-public
entities exercising executive power. The question stated: "(3) Is
the Constitutional Amendment to Article IX, Section 5, so-called
Separation of Powers Amendment, passed by the electorate on
November 2, 2004, which calls into question the constitutionality
of the appointing authority, self-executing or does it require
legislative enactment for its implementation?"8 9
On November 22, 2006, however, the justices issued an order
stating "we are unable to entertain the request set forth in the ...
86. H.R. 8170, ch. 46-23.3.2, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2006).
87. H.R. 8290, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2006).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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House resolution."90 The justices explained that they "refrain
from answering requests for advisory opinions from either House
of the General Assembly when the composition of the legislative
body that propounded the question inevitably will change as a
result of an intervening general election."91
Taking notice of the fact that a Rhode Island general election
was held on November 7, 2006, the justices reasoned that given
the passage of time and "the fact that this Court has not yet
issued an Order requesting briefing from the parties or setting a
date for oral argument, we will not reasonably be able to respond
before the newly composed House is engaged this January
[2007] .,92 The justices did remark, however, that:
Our decision herein must not be interpreted as an
attempt to diminish the gravity of the issues presented by
this request for our advisory opinion. Clearly, the
Honorable House of Representatives as constituted as of
January 2, 2007, may adopt a new resolution,
propounding these same inquiries to the justices of this
Court.93
Notwithstanding the justices' caution in addressing the 2004
amendments for the first time in an advisory opinion, the issues
presented by the House resolution present the first test of the
meaning, scope, and strength of the amendments, and how they
will be implemented. Whether addressed in 2007 by the justices
in the legal arena, or by elected representatives in the legislative
arena, they must be addressed. Considering that two years have
passed since the voters approved a redistribution of governmental
power, and significant questions have yet to be resolved, this
Article will attempt to address them here and now.
The House directed three questions (questions 1, 2, and 4) to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court to determine whether the state
constitution still permits legislators to sit on the CRMC or to
appoint other persons who will. That arrangement can only be
constitutional, however, under one of two circumstances. The first
90. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives (CRMC), 911
A.2d 274, 276 (R.I. 2006).
91. Id. at 275.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 276.
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circumstance is narrow while the other is potentially very broad.
The narrow circumstance is if the CRMC does not in fact exercise
"executive power under the laws of this state. '94 The broader and
potentially more far-reaching issue is with regard to the
invocation of clause 3 of article I, section 17 by the General
Assembly. Assuming the CRMC does exercise executive power,
several questions arise. Is the General Assembly's duty under
clause 3 to "provide for the conservation of the . . . natural
resources of the state," and "to adopt all means necessary and
proper by law to protect the natural environment," a grant of sole
and exclusive combined governmental power with respect to
environmental matters? If so, this grant of power would permit
the legislature to configure and control the CRMC without regard
to the 2004 separation of powers amendments.95 Or is clause 3
instead a restriction on the legislative power as are all the other
protections of article I's "Declaration of Certain Constitutional
Rights and Principles"? 96  Is clause 3 a directive on how the
General Assembly must exercise its legislative power, thereby
constitutionally obliging the General Assembly to enact only
environmental legislation that is consistent with "the
preservation, regeneration and restoration of the national
environment of the state,"9 7 setting that as the constitutional
standard by which environmental legislation must be judged? In
order to resolve these issues, it is important to understand some of
Rhode Island's constitutional history leading up to the 2004
amendments to the state constitution, a constitutional history
that is necessarily related to America's constitutional history.
DISTRIBUTION AND SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER - A
FUNDAMENTAL ASPECT OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS FORMED
BETWEEN 1776 AND 1787
"Perhaps no principle of American constitutionalism has
attracted more attention than that of separation of powers. It has
in fact come to define the very character of the American political
94. R.I. CONST. art. III, § 6.
95. H.R. 8170, ch. 46-23-1(a)(1), 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I.
2006).
96. R.I. CONST. art. I.
97. Id. at art. I, § 17.
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system.''98 An early articulation of the principle by the French
political philosopher Montesquieu declared: "When the legislative
and executive powers are united in the same person, in the same
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty."99  Americans,
however, in 1776, and more emphatically in the subsequent
decade through 1787, elevated the doctrine into what James
Madison would call "a first principle of free government."'100 This
principle was "born during the state constitution-making period
between 1775 and the early 1780s."101 Initially, Americans were
mostly concerned with prohibitions against dual-office holding. 10 2
As a result, they gave only verbal recognition to separation of
powers in the early post-Revolutionary state constitutions. 10 3
After 1776, however, concerns arose with respect to "the effects of
legislative sovereignty and the unanticipated excesses of the
Revolutionary constitutions." 104 The principle of separation of
powers was invoked to address "what seemed to be a dangerous
blurring of the three major functions of government," the
executive, legislative, and judicial. 105  According to historian
Gordon S. Wood, nearly all of the proposals for constitutional
change occurring between 1776 and 1787 were means of
separating these three functions of government. 106
The assumption behind this remarkable elaboration and
diffusion of the idea of separation of powers was that all
governmental power, whether in the hands of governors,
judges, senators, or representatives, was essentially
indistinguishable;
By the 1780's many had come to believe that the principle
98. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-
1787, at 151 (The University of North Carolina Press 1969).
99. Id. at 152 (quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151-52
(Newmann Bk. XI, Sec. 6)).
100. Id. (quoting James Madison, PHILADELPHIA NATIONAL GAZETTE, Feb.
6, 1792; THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 91 (Gaillard Hunt, ed.)).
101. Wood, supra note 3, at 911.
102. Wood, supra note 98, at 153-54, 156.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 451.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 452.
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of separation of powers was "the basis of all free
governments," the most important attribute of the kinds
of governments they had fought for. 107
It embodied the political philosophy that, in Thomas
Jefferson's words, "the powers of government should be so divided
and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one
could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually
checked and restrained by the others." 108
Separation of powers, whether describing executive,
legislative, and judicial separation or the bicameral
division of the legislature . . . was simply a portioning of
political power, the creation of a plurality of discrete
governmental elements, all detached from yet responsible
to and controlled by the people, checking and balancing
each other, preventing any one power from asserting
itself too far. The libertarian doctrine of separation of
powers was expanded and exalted by the Americans to
the foremost position in their constitutionalism, premised
on the belief, in John Dickinson's words, that
"government must never be lodged in a single body." 109
In short, the belief took hold that "[t]he separation of this
governmental power, rather than simply the participation of the
people in a part of government, became the best defense of
liberty," and protection against the potential abuse of
governmental power. 110
RHODE ISLAND'S EARLY SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE - IMPLIED
PROHIBITION
Despite the evolution and general recognition of separated
and distributed powers as an important principle of American
government in the years following independence, Rhode Island's
charter government did not embrace the principle of separation of
power. Following the Declaration of Independence, the authority
of general sovereignty passed to each of the former colonial states,
107. Id. at 453 (quoting PORTSMOUTH N.H. GAZETTE, March 15, 1783).
108. Id. (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, 120 (Peden,
ed.)).
109. Id. at 604.
110. Id. at 608.
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and Congress passed a resolution advising the colonies to form
new governments. 1 1 While most colonies formed governments
adhering to the notion of separation of powers, 112 Rhode Island did
not."13 Rhode Island's original Royal Charter of 1663 remained its
governing document, 114 revised only to eliminate references to the
crown. 115 Under the Royal Charter, the General Assembly
possessed and controlled all the attributes of sovereignty, 1 6 and it
exercised "every kind of governmental power, legislative,
executive, and judicial."" 17
By 1841, however, "the omnipotence and adamancy 'of the
legislature," along with limited suffrage and increasing mal-
apportionment, became grievances severe enough for the
establishment of a new constitutional document. 1 8 The text of
the constitution adopted in 1842, unlike the earlier federal
constitution, contained an explicit distribution of powers clause
that declared: "[t]he powers of government shall be distributed
into three departments; the legislative, executive, and judicial."" 9
The distribution of powers clause vested in the governor, the "chief
executive power," thereby requiring him or her to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed."' 20 The clause vested the judicial
power "in one supreme court, and in-such inferior courts as the
general assembly may, from time to time, ordain and establish"'121
and the legislative power "in two houses, the one to be called the
senate, the other the house of representatives; and both together
111. See Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69
TEMP. L. REV. 989, 989-90 (1996).
112. Id. at 990.
113. Id.
114. In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1330 (R.I.
1986) (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
115. Wood, supra note 3, at 913.
116. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (R.I. Ethics Comm'n -
Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 62 (R.I. 1999).
117. Gorham v. Robinson, 186 A. 832, 839 (1936); see also City of
Providence v. Moulton, 160 A. 75, 78 (1932) (under the Charter, the General
Assembly "exercised supreme legislative, executive and judicial power").
118. PATRICK T. CONLEY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF LAWS AND
LAWYERS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1636-1998, at 205 (Rhode Island Publication
Society 1998).
119. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. III (1843).
120. Id. at art. VII, §§ 1, 2.
121. Id. at art. X, § 1.
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the general assembly."' 22 The new constitution, however, also
contained a separate provision related to the legislature, declaring
that: "[t]he general assembly shall continue to exercise the powers
they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this
constitution." 123
Notwithstanding the nominal distribution of powers among
three different governmental entities, the General Assembly
continued to exercise both ultimate judicial power, 124 and
"substantial executive functions," including appointments to
"executive-type boards."' 25  The General Assembly's post-
constitution exercise of judicial power was the subject of In re
Dorr,126 and Taylor v. Place,127 the first judicial decisions to
address the new state constitution's text, organizational structure,
and governing principles.
In re Dorr considered the General Assembly's constitutional
authority to enact legislation "to reverse and annul the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island for treason rendered
against Thomas W. Dorr."' 28  The court issued an advisory
opinion, which concluded that the General Assembly no longer
had authority to exercise "judicial" power. 129 The justices based
their conclusion on the premise that where the constitution's text
vested one branch with legislative authority and another with
judicial, "[e]ach is vested with exclusive power in its appropriate
sphere," and "[t]he power exclusively conferred upon the one
department is, by necessary implication, denied to the other.' 30
The justices concluded that the object of the constitution was to
guard against the "union of all the powers of government in the
122. Id. at art. IV, §§ 2, 10.
123. Id.
124. See Taylor v. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 348-49 (1856). The first digest of laws
enacted after the constitution became effective, the General Laws of 1844,
contained an act modernizing the method of petitioning the General
Assembly for review of decisions of the court. See Patrick T. Conley, Article
VI, Section 4: A Case Study in Constitutional Obsolescence, 53 R.I. B.J. 7, 9
(2004).
125. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 64 (R.I. 1999).
126. In re Dorr, 3 R.I. 299, 300 (R.I. 1854).
127. Taylor, 4 R.I. at 324.
128. Dorr, 3 R.I. at 299. The judgment was rendered on June 25, 1844.
Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 300-01.
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same hands," and the judicial power conferred on the courts was
"necessarily prohibited to the General Assembly."']31
Addressing the reserved powers clause, the justices concluded
the term "power" as used in this clause meant the General
Assembly could continue to exercise the legislative power it
previously exercised, not the judicial power it had exercised prior
to the constitution's adoption. 132 Section 10 did not "reserve" the
authority of the General Assembly to exercise judicial power as it
had prior to the constitution's enactment, because, as the justices'
concluded:
all judicial power . is prohibited to the General
Assembly[,] by implication, it is true - but the prohibition
is as strong as if it were expressed.
To construe the section, therefore, as conferring judicial
power, would bring its two points in direct conflict with
each other, and render the whole nugatory; for as all
judicial power is prohibited to the General Assembly by
other provisions of the Constitution, none would be
conferred by [Section 10]. 133
The justices found it would be "unreasonable" to conclude the
constitutional text permitted "unit[ing] in one body" the powers
that previous provisions had specifically vested in several bodies,
"more especially when we recollect that the distribution of these
powers is declared by the constitution to be its fundamental
principle."134
Two years later, in Taylor v. Place, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court again addressed the same question - whether the General
Assembly could exercise judicial power under the state
constitution as it had under the charter. 135 In holding that it
could not, the court related the political philosophy of
Montesquieu to the new state constitution's distribution of
131. Id. at 301.
132. Id. at 304.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 304-05 (emphasis added).
135. Taylor v. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 324 (1856). Taylor involved a justiciable
case or controversy between adversaries and was therefore a decision by the
court exercising judicial power, as opposed to Dorr, which was a non-judicial
advisory opinion.
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powers. 136 The court stated that "[t]here can be no liberty where
the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person
or body of magistrates"; or, "if the power of judging be not
separated from the legislative and executive powers."1 37 The court
began its analysis by setting forth the pertinent distribution of
powers provisions of the new constitution. Article III, section 1
distributed the powers of government into three departments: the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial. 138 Article IV, section 2
vested "the legislative power under the constitution" in the
general assembly. 139  Article VII, section 1 vested "the chief
executive power" in the governor. 140 Article X, section 1 vested the
"judicial power of this State" in the supreme court and in inferior
courts established by the General Assembly. 141 Lastly, Article IV,
section 10 contained a reservation, providing that "[t]he general
assembly shall continue to exercise the powers they have hitherto
exercised, unless prohibited in this constitution."1 42
To the 1856 Rhode Island Supreme Court, "the unity of design
and purpose manifested in" these provisions was obvious. 143 The
provisions had to be read in light of the principle of the separation
of the powers of government, which had a "well known history"
and a "long and firmly established meaning and purpose."1 The
new state constitution distributed the powers of government
between different departments "for the purpose of excluding each
department from exercising those appropriate to the others.' 45
Equally significant, if not more so, the court embraced and applied
the rule that "[a]ffirmative words, vesting power under a
constitution, are construed as prohibiting the exercise of the
power by all other departments of the government . . . when
otherwise, the words would have no operation at all, or would not
have their full and proper operation."1 46 The implied prohibition
136. Id. at 341.
137. Id.
138. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. III (1843).
139. Id. at art. IV, § 2.
140. Id. at art. VII, § 1.
141. Id. at art. X, § 1.
142. Id. at art. IV, § 10.
143. Taylor v. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 347-48 (1856).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 358 (emphasis in original). The court noted this rule had
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against legislative exercise of the powers explicitly delegated to
the judicial and executive departments was so plain, so
unavoidable, that it was "equivalent to an express
prohibition."' 47 Consequently, although the General Assembly
had exercised judicial power, this clause did not reserve the
exercise of that power. Exercise of judicial power by the General
Assembly was "prohibited in this constitution" by the vesting of
that power in the courts. 148 In other words, the judicial power had
been specifically divested from the General Assembly. 149
After Taylor, the court continued to voice approval of the
"implied prohibition" theory of the state constitution's separation
of powers. In Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Company, the
court recognized that, unlike the federal constitution, the object of
a state constitution "is not to grant legislative power, but to
confine and restrain" its power. 150 The power starts as plenary,
and the limitations on that power "are created and imposed by
express words, or arise by necessary implication."'5 1 In fact, the
court emphasized:
The leading feature of the Constitution is the separation
and distribution of the powers of the government. It
always been applied to the clauses distributing the powers of government in
American constitutions and that it would "apply to the same clause of our
constitution." Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)) (emphasis
added).
147. Id. at 359 ("[Tjhe affirmative words giving a class of powers to one
department, no less plainly and imperatively prohibit the exercise of them by
another.").
148. Id. at 361.
149. The court has vigilantly and continuously guarded against the
General Assembly's attempted exercise of essentially judicial power
throughout our state history. See, e.g., City of Providence v. Employee
Retirement Bd., 749 A.2d 1088, 1098 (R.I. 2000); State v. Almonte, 644 A.2d
295, 298 (R.I. 1994); Bartlett v. Danti, 503 A.2d 515, 517 (R.I. 1986); Lemoine
v. Martineau, 342 A.2d 616, 620 (R.I. 1975); State v. Garnetto, 63 A.2d 777,
779-80 (R.I. 1949). It has also sent polite messages concerning potential
violations of the separated judicial and legislative powers. See State v. Price,
.672 A.2d 893, 896 n.2 (R.I. 1996) ("Given our holding in Taylor and our
conclusion that the power to punish for contempt rests inherently in the
courts, were the General Assembly to enact legislation regulating the
contempt powers of this state's courts, such action could give rise to a
fundamental issue of separation of powers.").
150. 77 A. 145 (1910).
151. Id. at 154 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
241 (7th ed. 1903)).
2007] COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 337
takes care to separate the executive, legislative, and
judicial powers, and to define their limits. The executive
can do no legislative act, nor the Legislature any
executive act, and neither can exercise judicial
authority.152
Thus, the plenary power of the General Assembly, namely "all
the powers of the crown and parliament . . . other than those
which the constitution textually commits to other branches of our
state government",153 is a plenary legislative power.154 "[T]he
state legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its
legislation is not prohibited,"155 but not the plenary power to
exercise all of the several powers of government. 156
Although the court in Taylor was specifically concerned with
the legislature's continued exercise of judicial power, its strong
implied prohibition rationale also logically and necessarily applied
to the legislature's continued exercise of executive powers. The
court did not address that issue, however, until 1999.157 But
rather than applying an "implied prohibition" rationale to prevent
the general assembly's exercise of executive power, the court
applied an "implied authorization" rationale. 158 This rationale
permitted members of the legislature to continue to sit on, and
appoint individuals to, agencies, commissions and boards
administering and executing laws passed by the General
Assembly, notwithstanding the explicit constitutional text
152. Id. Accord Creditor's Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 190 A. 2, 8 (R.I. 1937)
("The constitutional distribution of the powers of government is at once a
grant of specific power to each department and a prohibition to the other two
with reference to that same power.").
153. Nugent v. City of East Providence, 238 A.2d 758, 762 (R.I. 1968); see
also In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Appointment to Fill Vacancy In
Office of Lieutenant Governor), 688 A.2d 288, 291 (R.I. 1997); Kass v. Ret.
Bd. of the Employees' Ret. Sys., 567 A.2d 358, 361 (R.I. 1989).
154. Kass, 567 A.2d at 361; Payne & Butler, 77 A. at 154.
155. 77 A. at 154 (emphasis added).
156. See Robert F. Williams, Rhode Island's Distribution of Powers
Question of the Century: Reverse Delegation and Implied Limits on Legislative
Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 159, 163-64 (1998) ("Focus on the
meaning of 'legislative power' is still necessary even where broad, plenary
state legislative power is recognized ... [t]he legislative power is, itself,
conceptually limited to the notion of 'legislating."').
157. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (R.I. Ethics Comm'n -
Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1999).
158. Id. at 71-72.
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distributing the powers of government, and installing the chief
executive power in the governor. 159
ABANDONING IMPLIED PROHIBITION FOR IMPLIED AUTHORIZATION
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics
Commission - Separation of Powers)160 considered the authority of
the state Ethics Commission to enact an ethics regulation that
would have prohibited members of the legislative branch from
sitting on, or appointing representatives to, all state executive,
public and quasi-public boards, authorities, corporations,
commissions, councils, or agencies, unless the entity either
functioned solely in an advisory capacity to the legislature or
exercised "solely legislative functions."16' Four of the five justices
concluded that the ethics commission's constitutional authority to
adopt a code of ethics under article III, section 8 did not provide it
with the power to adopt such a regulation. 162 The justices set
forth two basic reasons.
First, the justices concluded article III, section 8 of the 1986
constitution, which mandated the creation of the Ethics
Commission, did not authorize the Commission "to adopt a
regulation that presumes and predetermines a priori, without
evidence of violation and without providing a hearing," that a
legislator sitting on a board, or appointing someone to a board,
was guilty of a conflict of interest, nor was such an arrangement
inherently unethical. 163 Secondly, the justices determined that
the state constitution did not prohibit legislative participation on,
or appointments to, "executive-type boards."' 6 4 They determined
that, as an historical matter, "legislative appointment of
executive-type boards has been a long-standing practice in this
state even under the first Constitution as early as 1844."165 The
court further noted that the practice had continued "well into the
20th century," with the legislature exercising "substantial
159. Id.
160. Id. at 55.
161. Id. at 57.
162. Id. at 65.
163. Id. at 66, 69.
164. Id. at 64.
165. Id. at 64-65.
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executive functions."1 66
The court focused on three issues: the lack of a specific
appointment clause on behalf of the chief executive similar to that
contained in the federal constitution, the absence of a prohibition
on dual office holding such as in Article I, section 6 of the Federal
Constitution, and the 1986 constitutional convention's readoption
of the reserved powers clause. 167 The justices concluded that they
"discern no authority in our 1986 state constitution suggesting
that any of its provisions were intended to remove from the
General Assembly its long acknowledged authority and practice to
appoint individuals from its membership to state governmental
public boards, commissions, or agencies." 168 They construed the
re-adoption of the reserved powers clause as a specific
"reaffirmation of the [appointment] powers historically exercised
by the Legislature under the prior constitution."1 69
Absent from the justices' advisory opinion, however, was any
discussion of the distribution of powers under article III, section 1,
or the "implied prohibition" analysis that was so predominant in
Taylor v. Place and which the court has resorted to continuously
in order to constitutionally restrain the legislative exercise of
judicial power. Instead of applying the implied prohibition
rationale to likewise restrain the legislature's exercise of executive
power, the justices relied on past historical practice,
notwithstanding its apparent conflict with the distribution of
powers clause. 170 The justices opined that "the sole and proper
procedure for restricting legislators from serving on or appointing
any other person to executive boards and commissions [was]
through an amendment to the constitution approved by the
electorate."'171 In fact, the advisory opinion encouraged a citizen
movement leading precisely to that result.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 64-65, 71.
168. Id. at 71.
169. Id. at 63 (quoting Kass v. Ret. Bd. of the Employees' Ret. Sys., 567
A.2d 358, 361 (R.I. 1989) (emphasis added)).
170. Id. at 72.
171. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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THE 2004 AMENDMENTS - PROHIBITING THE LEGISLATIVE EXERCISE OF
EXECUTIVE POWER
The separation of powers constitutional amendments,
proposed by the General Assembly and approved by 78% of the
voters in November 2004, addressed and attacked the very basis
for the 1999 advisory opinion's conclusion. 172  The opinion
concluded that there was no constitutional impediment to
legislators sitting on state entities administering and
implementing the laws, or to the General Assembly or its
members appointing the individuals who would exercise that
authority. 173
First, to emphasize a complete departure from "the powers
historically exercised by the Legislature under the prior
constitution,"174 including appointments to "executive type
boards," the reserved powers clause was eliminated. 175 Whereas
the retention of that clause in the 1986 constitution signified to
the justices an assent to the powers historically exercised by the
legislature, its repeal in 2004 signified an explicit rejection of the
historical exercise of those powers. In the absence of the reserved
powers clause, which had been used to cloud the distribution of
legislative and executive power seemingly mandated by the
distribution of powers clause, that distribution of powers became
endowed with a correspondingly greater meaning and purpose.
Equally significant, the intended separation of legislative,
executive, and judicial power was fortified by changing article V's
mandate that "[t]he powers of government shall be distributed
into three departments," to the substantially more specific
mandate that those powers "shall be distributed into three
separate and distinct departments." 176 The clear implication of
this change is that the power vested in one department could not
be exercised by the other departments vested with "separate and
172. S.J. Res. 180, 117th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2003); Nat'l
Conference of State Legislatures, 2004 Rhode Island Election Results
(available online at www.ncls.org); Rhode Island 2004 Voter Handbook
(available online at www.rilin.state.ri.us).
173. Id.
174. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (R.I. Ethics Comm'n -
Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 63 (R.I. 1999).
175. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
176. Id. at art. V.
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distinct" powers. 177 The addition of the phrase "separate and
distinct" underscored that, not only were the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers to be distributed among three different
branches, but that both the powers and the exercise of those
distributed powers was to be separate and not shared. Together
these two changes were an explicit pronouncement by the people
that the legislature shall not exercise executive power, as clear
and forceful as the pronouncement by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in Taylor v. Place that the legislature shall not exercise
judicial power.
The amendment of the distribution of powers clause 178 and
the repeal of the reserved powers clause 179 addressed the
distribution and separation of powers generally. The remaining
two amendments, however, targeted a specific part of state
government exercising increasing power and influence in
governing, namely statutorily created administrative and
regulatory entities.
The growth of administrative and regulatory agencies at both
the state and federal levels has been described as "massive," with
state agencies approaching their federal counterparts in both size
and power.'80 This expanding administrative state has occurred
in Rhode Island, with one study concluding that Rhode Island has
429 agencies, boards, and commissions; as many as seventy-three
perform executive functions. 18 1 The 2004 amendment to article III,
section 6 specifically prohibits senators or representatives from
being "appointed to any state office, board, commission or other
state or quasi-public entity exercising executive power under the
laws of [Rhode Island]."'1 82 More importantly, the amendment to
article IX, section 5 shifted the power of appointment over entities
exercising executive power, formerly exercised by the legislature,
to the governor, who "shall, by and with the advice and consent of
the senate, appoint . . .all members of any board commission or
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at art. VI, § 10.
180. John Devlin, Towards a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of
Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative
Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (1993).
181. See Separation of Powers Reference Manual (available at
www.commoncauseri.org).
182. R.I. CONST. art. III, § 6.
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other state quasi-public entity which exercises executive power
under the laws of this state."1 83
The separation and distribution of powers in the 1842
constitution was arguably focused to a significant degree on
halting the General Assembly's exercise of judicial power, and to
enhance the role of the judiciary. 184  The separation and
distribution of powers adopted by the people in 2004, however,
was unarguably designed to halt the General Assembly's exercise
of executive power, and to enhance the role of the executive.18 5
Any analysis of a legislative attempt to control or exercise
executive functions performed by administrative and regulatory
entities such as the CRMC must be informed by, and responsive
to, the historic mandate represented by the 2004 amendments.
THE CRMC EXERCISES THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF GOVERNMENT
With respect to the applicability of the 2004 amendments to
the CRMC, one must first determine whether the CRMC
"exercises executive power under the laws of this state."1 86 To
determine whether it does, it is helpful to determine what
constitutional powers it does not exercise. Because it does not
exercise either judicial or legislative power in a constitutional
sense, it therefore. must exercise the only power left - the
executive power.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has previously held that the
CRMC, although it exercises quasi-judicial power, does not
exercise constitutional judicial power.187  The administrative
hearings of the CRMC "are not judicial in nature, for the 'tribunal'
is totally lacking in power to enforce its purported decree."'88 A
decision of the CRMC, after a hearing, is not enforceable by virtue
of its own power. 189 Instead, the CRMC must apply to a court of
183. Id. at art. IX, § 5.
184. See generally Thomas R. Bender, For a More Vigorous State
Constitutionalism, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 621, 650-63 (2005).
185. Id.
186. R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 5. See also R.I. CONST. art. III, § 6 ("exercising
executive power under the laws of this state").
187. Sartor v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 542 A.2d 1077, 1081 (R.I.
1988).
188. Id. (citing Taylor v. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 336 (1856)).
189. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-7 (1996)).
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competent jurisdiction for enforcement of its determination. 190
Because the CRMC's authority is exercised "subject to judicial
intervention at the appropriate juncture in the proceedings[,]" the
court has held that "the CRMC does not exercise judicial
power." 191
Neither does the CRMC exercise "legislative power" in a
constitutional sense. Article VI, section 2 vests the legislative
power of government "in two houses, the one to be called the
senate, the other the house of representatives, and both together
the general assembly [, and t]he concurrence of the two houses
shall be necessary to the enactment of laws. ' 192  It is the
enactment of laws that is the constitutional exercise of legislative
power, and in American constitutional law, the bicameralism
requirement serves as a restraint on the exercise of legislative
power and an internal check within the legislative department
itself.193 By dividing the legislative power between two distinct
houses, and requiring the concurrence of both for the passage of
law, bicameralism works to ensure that legislation is carefully and
fully considered before it becomes law.194
The constitutional exercise of legislative power also has an
additional requirement - presentment. 195 Article IX, section 14
requires that bills, resolutions, and votes that have been passed by
both houses of the General Assembly "shall be presented to the
governor[,]" who has a qualified right to reject the proposed law.196
If the governor vetoes the proposed law, it may not become
operative unless passed by a three-fifths vote in each house. 197
The decision to provide the chief executive with a limited and
qualified power to nullify proposed legislation by veto is based on
the belief that the legislative power should be circumscribed even
190. Id.
191. Id. Compare Michigan Chiropractic Council v. Comm'n of the Office of
Fin. Servs., 716 N.W.2d 561, 567 n.18 (Mich. 2006) ("[A]n administrative
agency does not possess 'judicial power'; rather, the authority of the
administrative agency is derived from the statute that created it.").
192. R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 14.
193. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
948-49 (1983).
194. Id. at 949.
195. Id. at 946-47.
196. R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 14.
197. Id.
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beyond the bicameralism requirement. This power provides the
executive with an "effectual power of self defense" against
legislative invasion of the rights of the executive, 198 and protects
against "oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures." 199
In sum, it serves as an executive check upon the legislative branch
superimposed over the internal check created by the requirement
of bicameralism.
The United States Supreme Court has described the dual
requirement of bicameralism and presentment as a "prescription
for legislative action," which represents a decision that legislative
power "be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedure. '200  Since constitutional
legislative power can only be exercised by the House of
Representatives and the Senate, and only after complying with
the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, the CRMC
cannot exercise the legislative power authorized by the
constitution. Consequently, because the CRMC does not, and
cannot, exercise either judicial or legislative power in a
constitutional sense, the only constitutional governmental power
left for it to exercise is necessarily, therefore, the executive
power. 20 1
Executive power is the power "to execute the laws," and "the
power to administer and enforce laws as enacted by the legislature
and as interpreted by courts. ''20 2 By definition, administrative
198. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 73 Alexander
Hamilton (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
199. Id. at 947-48.
200. Id. at 951.
201. See Galbraith v. Lenape Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 889, 894
(D.N.J. 1997) ("Administrative agencies ... are only empowered to exercise
executive power in administering legislative authority selectively delegated
to them by statute.") (internal quotations omitted); Michigan Chiropractic
Council v. Comm'n of the Office of Fin. Servs., 716 N.W.2d 561, 567 n.18
(Mich. 2006) ("While administrative agencies often act in a quasi-judicial
capacity, it is recognized that they are established to perform essentially
executive functions.") (internal quotations omitted); City of Hackensack v.
Winner, 410 A.2d 1146, 1159 (N.J. 1980) (administrative agencies "are
separately created and exercise executive power in administering legislative
authority selectively delegated to them by statute"); State Dep't of Taxes v.
Tri-State Indus. Laundries, Inc., 415 A.2d 216, 218 (Vt. 1980) (same).
202. Jordan v. Smith, 669 So. 2d 752, 758 (Miss. 1996) (citing Alexander v.
Allain, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1338 (Miss. 1983)); see West Virginia Citizens Group
v. West Virginia Econ. Redev. Grant Comm., 580 S.E.2d 869, 877 (W. Va.
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agencies administer and enforce the statutes pertinent to their
mission and existence. 203 In fact, the term "administrative" is
synonymous with "executive."204  The term "[c]onnotes of or
pertains to administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing, or superintending the
execution, application or conduct of persons or things. '20 5 Indeed,
administrative acts are "[t]hose which are necessary to be done to
carry out legislative policies and purposes already declared by the
legislative body.''206 Administrative agencies therefore serve to
"effectuate the obligation of the executive branch to see that the
laws are faithfully executed. '207
Article VI, sections 1 and 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution
forbid the General Assembly from delegating the constitutional
power to enact legislation to agents or even a limited number of its
own members.20 8 The state constitution does permit, however, the
General Assembly to "engage the expertise and assistance of
administrative agents to effectuate" legislation it enacts. 209 The
General Assembly may thereby constitutionally confer a cabined
decision-making authority upon an agency, commission, or council
by enacting legislation that provides "standards or principles to
2003) ("Generally speaking, the Legislature enacts the law, the Governor and
the various agencies of the executive implement the law, and the courts
interpret the law, adjudicating individual disputes arising thereunder."); see
also McInnish v. Riley, 925 So. 2d 174, 179 (Ala. 2005) ("[T]he core power of
the legislative branch is, therefore, the making of laws, while the core power
of the executive branch is the enforcement of those laws.") (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis removed); Salt Lake County Cottonwood
Sanitary v. Sandry City, 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Simply stated,
legislative powers are policy making powers while executive powers are
policy execution powers.") (emphasis in original).
203. See Whitehouse v. Davis, 774 A.2d 816, 818 (R.I. 2001) ("[A]n
administrative agency will be accorded great deference in interpreting a
statute whose administration and enforcement have been entrusted to the
agency.") (internal quotations omitted).
204. McInnish v. Riley, 925 So. 2d 174, 185 (Ala. 2005).
205. Id. (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 45 (6th ed. 1990)) (emphasis
added).
206. Id.
207. Galbraith, 964 F. Supp. at 894 (citing City of Hackensack, 410 A.2d
1146).
208. Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174, 1179 (R.I. 1994).
209. Id. (citing Davis v. Woods, 427 A.2d 332, 335-36 (R.I. 1981))
(emphasis added).
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confine and guide" the decision-making power.210  Decision-
making authority exercised by administrative entities to
effectuate legislation, whether in the form of rule-making or
administrative adjudication, is an exercise of executive power and
authority.
In the context of administrative matters delegated to an
agency by the legislature, it is presumed "that the Legislature
intended for the agency to interpret legislative language, in a
reasonable manner consistent with legislative intent, in order to
develop the necessary policy to respond to unaddressed or
unforeseen issues. '211 The United States Supreme Court has
observed that "[i]nterpreting a law enacted by [the Legislature] to
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of the
'execution' of the law."2 12 Additionally:
an agency to which [the legislative branch] has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
[executive] administration's views of wise policy to inform
its judgments. While agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices - resolving the
competing interests, which [the legislative branch] itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left
to be resolved by the agency charged with administration
210. Davis, 427 A.2d at 336. Cf. Whitman v. American Trucking Assoc.,
Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("Article I, §1, of the Constitution vests "[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States.
This text permits no delegation of those powers ... and so we repeatedly have
said that when Congress confers decision-making authority upon agencies
Congress must lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform.") (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis in original); Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res.
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("The power of an
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.") (internal quotations
omitted).
211. City of Albuquerque v. New Mexico Pub. Regulation, 79 P.3d 297, 306
(N.M. 2003).
212. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
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of the statute in light of everyday realities.213
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has previously upheld the
General Assembly's delegation of authority to the CRMC, holding
that the legislature sufficiently defined the policy underlying the
creation of the CRMC: "to preserve, protect, develop and where
possible, restore the coastal resources of the state for this and
succeeding generations through comprehensive and coordinated
long-range planning and management designed to produce the
maximum benefit for society from such coastal resources. ' 214 The
General Assembly cabined the CRMC's decision-making authority,
however, by mandating that its actions be guided by a "single
overriding criteria. '215 Namely, the General Assembly required
that "preservation and restoration of ecological systems shall be
the primary guiding principle upon which environmental
alteration of coastal resources will be measured, judged and
regulated."216
Consequently, when the CRMC develops plans in accordance
with the legislatively declared policy of managing the coastal
resources; when it enacts rules and regulations to implement and
administer those plans; when it issues licenses, permits and
easements; and when it investigates, holds hearings, and enforces
those regulations by fines, orders, and administrative and judicial
hearings, it is exercising executive power. In administering the
provisions of chapter 23 of title 46 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, the CRMC acts in an executive capacity. The CRMC's law-
executing actions, although sometimes resembling legislative or
judicial action, are executive actions from a constitutional
perspective. 217 The CRMC is "always subject to check by the
terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is
exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of the
[Legislature] to modify or revoke the authority entirely. '218
213. City of Albuquerque, 79 P.3d at 306 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-
66).
214. Milardo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 434 A.2d 266, 271 (R.I. 1981)
(citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-1 (1980 Reenactment)).
215. Id. at 271 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-1 (1980 Reenactment)).
216. Id.
217. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953
(1983).
218. Id.; see also Sartor v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 542 A.2d 1077,
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In sum, the constitutional and governmental power that
administrative entities such as the CRMC exercise is executive.
Administrative rule-making and adjudication are executive
functions that are part and parcel of implementing and enforcing
the laws enacted by the legislature and interpreted by the courts.
This executive power is checked by the judiciary's authority to
ensure the agency's actions conform to its statutory authority, as
well as the power of the legislature to modify or withdraw the
agency's authority altogether by repealing or modifying the
enabling statute. 219 The CRMC is therefore a "board, commission
or other state or quasi-public entity which exercises executive
power under the laws of this state. '220 Legislators are barred from
being members of the CRMC under article III, section 6, and the
power of appointing its members belongs exclusively to the
governor under article IX, section 5.221
No COMBINED LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER EITHER
THE COMMON LAW PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE OR CLAUSE 1 OF SEC. 17
It seems reasonably clear that the CRMC "exercises executive
power under the laws of this state," as set forth in both article IX,
section 5 and article III, section 6.222 Notwithstanding the
executive nature of the CRMC's functions, however, the House of
Representatives' reference to article I, section 17 suggests that it
still believes it possesses the constitutional authority to appoint
the CRMC's members, or authorize members of the House of
Representatives or Senate to sit on the CRMC themselves. 223
During the 2006 legislative session, at a joint hearing of the
Senate Committee on Environment and Agriculture and the
Committee on Government Oversight, one witness cited language
from the post-2004 amendment decision in Town of Westerly v.
Bradley.224 In Bradley, the Rhode Island Supreme Court wrote:
1081 (R.I. 1988).
219. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
220. R.I. CONST. art. III, § 6.
221. Id.; id. at art. IX, § 10.
222. Id. at art. IX, § 5; id. at art. III, § 6.
223. See Town of Westerly v. Bradley, 877 A.2d 601, 606-07 (R.I. 2005)
(citing Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259-60 (R.I.
1999)).
224. Joint Hearing to Review the Functions and Responsibilities of the
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council, Before the S. Comm.
2007] COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 349
"Under the public trust doctrine, the General Assembly is vested
with the authority and responsibility for regulating and preserving
tidal lands and may determine appropriate uses for tidal land,
grant tidal land to another, or 'delegate the authority to regulate
that land on the state's behalf.'' 225 The Bradley decision stated
that exclusive jurisdiction over the state's tidal lands, purportedly
belonging to the General Assembly, has been delegated to the
CRMC. 226  From this language, the witness apparently
extrapolated that a single branch of state government, the
General Assembly, has exclusive authority to govern with respect
to public trust tidal lands. 22 7 Accordingly, the CRMC performs a
"legislative function. '228 The flaw fatal to the analysis, however, is
that the common law public trust doctrine vests title to, and
authority over, tidal lands in the State of Rhode Island, and not
just the legislative branch of the state's tripartite government. 229
It is "the state [that] possesses broad power over tidal land,' '230
not merely the General Assembly. The General Assembly may
enact legislation affecting tidal lands and has by statute created
the CRMC and conferred to it authority over those tidal lands.
These powers do not mean, however, that the state's legislative
branch has exclusive state authority over those lands. From the
on Env't and Agric. and S. Comm. on Gov't Oversight 33-34 (R.I. 2006)
(statement of Robert Goldberg, citizen).
225. 877 A.2d at 606-07 (quoting Thorton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d at 1259-
60) (emphasis added).
226. Id. at 607.
227. Joint Hearing to Review the Functions and Responsibilities of the
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council, Before the S. Comm.
on Env't and Agric. and S. Comm. on Gov't Oversight 33-34 (R.I. 2006)
(statement of Robert Goldberg, citizen).
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., Bradley, 877 A.2d at 607 ("The state's plenary authority over
tidal lands is nevertheless restricted by art. I, sec. 17"); Champlin's Realty
Assoc. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1165-66 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Greater
Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1041 (R.I. 1995))
("The public trust doctrine dictates that the state holds title to all land below
the high-water mark in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of the public.
...The jus privatum relates to the state's title to tidal lands."); Thornton-
Whitehouse, 740 A.2d at 1259 ("Under the public-trust doctrine, the state
holds title to all land below the high water mark in a proprietary capacity for
the benefit of the public. ...The state's authority over that land is limited by
article I, sec. 17, of the Rhode Island Constitution.") (all emphasis added).
230. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d at 1259 (emphasis added).
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time of Lord Matthew Hale's celebrated treatise, De Jure Maris,231
to the American Revolution, and up through today, the public
trust doctrine has placed title to submerged lands in the
sovereign,232 that is, the people of the state.233  As a single
department of state government, the General Assembly only has
as much authority over the state's tidal lands as is conferred by
the people through the device of the state constitution. That does
not, however, include the executive power to administer laws
concerned with such public trust lands. That power remains with
the executive. The common law rule that the state, as the
expression of the people's sovereignty, holds title to tidal lands
simply does not confer exclusive, or even legislative and executive,
governmental power over those lands to the General Assembly.
Moreover, the aspect of the public trust doctrine that places
title to submerged lands in the state, the jus privatum, is not
codified in the state constitution. Article I, section 17 does not
vest title in the state to any lands, much less tidal lands.2 34 What
it does codify is the jus publicum aspect of the doctrine, which
holds that the state's common law title is subject to certain rights
of the public. 235 The jus publicum aspect of the public trust
doctrine codified in clause 1 of article I, section 17, not only does
not confer executive governmental power on the legislature, but it
limits the manner in which it may legislate. 236 The General
Assembly may not constitutionally enact legislation that
impermissibly curtails "the rights of fishery, and the privileges of
the shore. '"237
Consequently, if article I, section 17 is to empower the
231. Lord Hale, De Jure Mars, in A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE
LAW RELATING THERETO 370 (WM. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1993).
232. Michelle A. Ruberto & Kathleen A. Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine
and Legislative Regulation in Rhode Island: A Legal Framework Providing
Greater Access to Coastal Resources in the Ocean State, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
353, 367-76 (1990).
233. In re Narragansett Indians, 40 A. 347, 367 (R.I. 1898) ("for when the
Revolution took place, . . . the people of each state became themselves
sovereign, and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable
waters, and the soils under them, for their [own] common use" (quoting
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842))).
234. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
235. Id. at art. I.
236. Id. at art. I, § 17.
237. Id.
2007] COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 351
General Assembly to exercise both legislative and executive power
over tidal lands, then that authorization must be found in clause 3
of that provision. Clause 3 is, however, like clause 1, a limitation
on the General Assembly's legislative power rather than a grant of
a consolidated legislative and executive power. 238 It is in essence
a constitutional environmental protection clause.
No COMBINED LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER CLAUSE 3
OF SEC. 17
As set forth earlier, the third and final clause of section 17
declares that "it shall be the duty of the general assembly to
provide for the conservation of the ... [state's] natural resources[,]
and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect the
natural environment. . . by providing adequate resource planning
for the control and regulation of [those] natural resources. '239 The
request for an advisory opinion suggests that the House of
Representatives believes this clause, contained in the "Declaration
of Certain Constitutional Rights and Principles," decapitates the
fundamental distribution and separation of executive and
legislative power effected by the 2004 amendments with respect to
the environment. The request also intimates that the House of
Representatives believes that the clause grants the General
Assembly a constitutional mandate to exercise both legislative and
executive powers over all environmental matters.240 The House
request suggests that, notwithstanding article IX, section 5, the
clause excludes the state's chief executive officer from any
constitutional role in appointing the membership of independent
regulatory bodies that are responsible for environmental
regulation - even when they exercise executive power.241  It
further suggests that, notwithstanding article III, section 6, it
permits members of the General Assembly to exercise executive
power as members of those bodies, including the CRMC. 242
To determine whether the state constitution can be
interpreted in such an extraordinary way, the analysis must start
238. Id. at art. I, § 17, cl. 3.
239. Id.
240. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives (CRMC), 911
A.2d 274, 75 (R.I. 2006).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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with two basic propositions recognized long ago by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas
Company.243 First, unlike the Federal Constitution, the general
object of the state constitution "is not to grant legislative power
but to confine and restrain" its power which is otherwise
plenary. 244  Second, "[t]he leading feature of the [state]
Constitution is the separation and distribution of the powers of
government . . . and to define their limits. '24 5 The House of
Representatives' suggestion that neither of these principles
applies to governmental regulation of the environment, and that
the General Assembly has complete and unfettered control in that
arena, cannot be supported by any reasoned analysis of the
location and language of clause 3.
As an initial matter, clause 3 appears in the state
constitution's "Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and
Privileges," the state analog of the Federal Constitution's Bill of
Rights.246 Like much of the Bill of Rights as applied through the
Fourteenth Amendment, the rights declared in article I of the
state constitution declare limits on the legislative power of the
General Assembly.247  Article I would be an exceptionally
awkward and inappropriate section of the state constitution to
insert a clause granting an extraordinary combined legislative and
executive authority, when all other parts of article I serve to limit
governmental authority.
Moreover, the language of clause 3 plainly contemplates that
the duty imposed on the General Assembly applies only to its role
of enacting legislation. By its terms, clause 3 directs the General
Assembly "to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to
protect the natural environment. '248 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court has consistently understood "adopt" to mean "create,"
243. Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 77 A. 145 (R.I. 1910).
244. Id. at 154.
245. Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 241
(7th ed. 1903)).
246. R.I. CONST. art. I; id. at art. I, § 17, cl. 3.
247. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549
(1985) ("[T]he developed application . . . of the greater part of the Bill of
Rights to the States limits the sovereign authority that States otherwise
would possess to legislate with respect to their citizens and conduct their own
affairs.").
248. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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"develop," and "enact," and has found that adopt "is synonymous
with 'enact.' 249 Applying the plain meaning to clause 3 compels
the conclusion that this clause imposes a duty on the General
Assembly to enact legislation "necessary and proper by law to
protect the environment. '250  To interpret the language as
authorizing the General Assembly to move beyond enacting laws
to executing and enforcing those same laws would stretch the
language beyond all reasonable intendment, and would explode
the structure of government contemplated by the 2004
amendments.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected a similar
argument made by Congress with respect to its authority over
congressional elections set forth in article I, section 4 of the
Federal Constitution.251  That section provides: "[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators. '252  In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court considered the
constitutional propriety of Congress' appointment of individuals to
serve on the Federal Elections Commission (FEC).253 The Court
concluded that the federal Appointments Clause authorized only
the President to make such appointments. The FEC argued that
because it exercised executive and administrative authority and
did not "operate[] merely in aid of congressional authority to
legislate, ' 254 the case stood "on a different footing than if Congress
had exercised its legislative authority in another field. '255
Rejecting the argument as both "novel and contrary to the
language of the Appointments Clause,"256 the Supreme Court
reasoned:
Congress has plenary authority in all areas where it has
249. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commission), 612
A.2d 1, 8-9 (R.I. 1992).
250. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17, cl. 3; Ethics Commission, 612 A.2d at 8-9.
251. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
252. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 4.
253. 424 U.S. 1.
254. Id. at 124-25, 138-39, 141.
255. Id. at 131.
256. Id. at 132.
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substantive legislative jurisdiction.., so long as exercise
of that authority does not offend some other
constitutional restriction. We see no reason to believe that
the authority of Congress over federal election practices is
of such a wholly different nature from other grants of
authority to Congress that it may be employed in such a
manner as to offend well-established constitutional
restrictions stemming from the separation of powers.257
That reasoning finds application here as well. There is no
plausible reading of clause 3 that would remotely suggest the
General Assembly has any constitutional authority to exercise
anything but legislative power over environmental matters. Nor
is it logical to except the exercise of governmental authority over
environmental matters from the fundamental principle of the
separation and distribution of powers clearly present in the 2004
amendments. That is particularly true with respect to the
appointment power over any state entity that "exercises executive
power under the laws of this state," which the electorate
specifically identified as a core executive function to be performed
by the governor.
Nor does the phrase "all means necessary and proper by law"
confer any authority on the legislative branch to exercise
constitutional executive power with respect to environmental
matters, by controlling the appointment of the members of the
CRMC in contravention of the governor's appointment power. In
rejecting a similar argument under the Necessary and Proper
Clause in Buckley,25 8 the United States Supreme Court reasonably
determined that:
Congress could not, merely because it concluded that...
a measure was "necessary and proper" to the discharge of
its substantive legislative authority, pass a bill of
attainder or ex post facto law contrary to the prohibitions
contained in§ 9 of Art. I. No more may it vest in itself, or
in its officers, the authority to appoint officers of the
United States when the Appointments Clause by clear
257. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
258. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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implication prohibits it from doing so. 259
Similarly, the duty "to adopt all means necessary and proper
by law to protect the natural environment" does not give the
General Assembly the power to enact legislation that would
permit it to appoint the members of an entity exercising executive
and administrative authority, such as the CRMC. 260 Nor can the
General Assembly allow its members to be appointed to such an
entity because it would be a direct violation of the 2004
amendments to article V, article IX, section 5, or article III,
section 6.261 The interpretation of clause 3 suggested by the
House of Representatives' request for an advisory opinion would
be wholly inconsistent with the predominant intent and feature of
the 2004 amendments, namely to distribute and separate the
executive and legislative powers with respect to administrative
entities.
Principles of constitutional interpretation require those who
would construe the constitution to "look to the history of the times
and examine the state of affairs as they existed when the
constitution was framed and adopted. ' 262  Above all, any
interpretation must "give effect to the intent of the framers. ' 263
The 2004 amendments were adopted with the specific design of
prohibiting the legislature from continuing to exercise executive
power.264  The amendments specifically declared that the
appointment of the individuals to administrative entities
exercising executive power was to be considered a core executive
function belonging to the governor. 265 As the basic structural
design of state government,266 the distribution of powers between
259. 424 U.S. at 135 (emphasis omitted).
260. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17, cl. 3.
261. Id.
262. McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 243 n.19 (R.I. 2005) (Suttell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor (R.I. Ethics Comm'n - Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 91
(R.I. 1999); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995); In re
Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commission), 612 A.2d 1, 8 (R.I.
1992).
263. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 45.
264. See generally Liz Anderson, General Assembly Unanimously Approves
Separation of Powers, PROVIDENCE J., July 1, 2003, at Al.
265. Id.
266. See Ethics Commission, 612 A.2d at 18 (stating separation of powers
is an "integral element of the republican form of government").
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"separate and distinct" departments is the state constitution's
"fundamental principle. '267 The principle of separation of powers
must necessarily permeate all parts of the constitution, including
clause 3.268 If the 2004 amendments establish a clear separation
of legislative and executive functions, it would be, in the words of
Dorr, "unreasonable," and unfathomable, to conclude that clause 3
permitted them to be "[re]united in one body. ' '269
A SELF-EXECUTING APPOINTMENT POWER
The final question posed by the House of Representatives in
its request for an advisory opinion was a broader attack on the
implementation of the 2004 amendments, and in particular, the
governor's new constitutional appointment power. The question
concerned whether the new appointments clause is a self-
executing constitutional provision, suggesting the governor was
not immediately vested with the appointment power when the
appointments clause was added to the state constitution.270 If
that interpretation is true, then the governor would not have the
constitutional power to appoint the members of the state entities
executing executive powers until the General Assembly decides to
authorize that power with regard to a particular entity, and
enacts legislation doing so. The determinative question is
whether this construction can reasonably be seen to reflect the
underlying intent of the appointments clause.
"The will of the people is paramount in determining whether
a constitutional provision is self-operating[j,] and the modern
doctrine favors the presumption that constitutional provisions are
intended to be self-operating. ' 271 The reason for this rule is self
267. In re Dorr, 3 R.I. 299, 305 (1854).
268. See Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126, 127 (R.I.
1965) (interpreting advisory opinion power in light of constitutional
separation of powers); see also Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 613
(R.I. 1963) (expressing "reluctance to subvert the principle of separation of
powers" in construing advisory opinion power).
269. Dorr, 3 R.I. at 304-05.
270. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives (CRMC), 911
A.2d 274, 75 (R.I. 2006).
271. Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960); see also Morgan v.
Bd. of Sup'rs, 192 P.2d 236, 241 (Ariz. 1948) ("The general presumption of the
law is that all constitutional provisions are self-executing, and are to be
interpreted as such, rather than requiring further legislation."); Davidson v.
Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 658 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) ("Constitutional
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evident: "in the absence of such presumption the legislature would
have the power to nullify the will of the people expressed in their
constitution, the most sacrosanct of all expressions of the
people. '272 The question ultimately is one of the intent of the
framers, in this case the electorate. The fundamental object is to
construe the amendment "in such manner as to fulfill the intent of
the people, never to defeat it. ' ' 273 The state constitution's new
appointments clause "must never be construed in such a manner
as to make it possible for the will of the people to be frustrated or
denied."274
When it appears that a constitutional provision may take
immediate effect without further action by the legislature, the
provision is deemed self-executing even though further legislation
may clarify or facilitate the execution of the provision. 275 A
constitutional provision need only lay down a sufficient rule
governing the exercise of the power.276 If a sufficient rule exists,
"it speaks for the entire people as their supreme law, and is full
authority for all that is done in pursuance of its provisions."277
Constitutional theory holds a presumption in favor of self-
executing constitutional provisions; where there is a choice, such a
construction avoids the possibility of legislative frustration of the
people's will.278
In Rhode Island, the people invested the governor with a very
specific power and responsibility: "[t]he governor shall .... appoint
... all members of any board, commission or other state or quasi-
public entity which exercises executive power under the laws of
provisions are presumed to be self-executing."); Russell v. Bliss, 101 N.E.2d
289, 291 (Ohio 1951) ("[T]he presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing."); Beatty v. Wittekamp, 172 S.E. 122, 125
(S.C. 1933) ("The general presumption of the law is that all constitutional
provisions are self-executing.").
272. Gray, 125 So. 2d at 851; see also Morgan, 192 P.2d at 241
(constitutional provisions are presumed self-executing "for the reason that,
unless such were done, it would be in the power of the Legislature to
practically nullify a fundamental of legislation").
273. Gray, 125 So. 2d at 852.
274. Id.
275. Davidson, 83 P.3d at 658.
276. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900).
277. Id.; see also Gray, 125 So. 2d at 852.
278. Gray, 125 So. 2d at 852.
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this state. ' 279  There are only two limitations on that power
apparent from the text of the appointments clause. The first
limitation is that the appointment must be confirmed by the
Senate, an action that does not require legislation to
implement. 280 The governor simply nominates an individual and
sends the nomination to the Senate. 281 The Senate has the duty to
consider the nomination and confirm or reject.2 82 The second
limitation is that the appointment may only be exercised with
respect to entities that exercise executive power, which means it
does not apply to a legislative commission. The sole function of a
legislative commission is to assist the General Assembly in the
enactment of legislation by performing investigative functions,
gathering and reporting information to the legislative body, and
making recommendations on the type of legislation that should be
enacted.28 3 Any entity that has the power to actually implement,
execute, administer, and enforce previously enacted statutes,
however, falls within the governor's appointment power.28 4 The
descriptive phrase, "exercising executive power under the laws of
this state" is a constitutionally sufficient principle guiding the
exercise of the power.285 This principle, taken together with the
presumption in favor of self-executing provisions, compels the
conclusion that article IX, section 5 is indeed self-executing. 286
In the case of most, if not all, of the boards and commissions
exercising executive, administrative, and enforcement functions,
there are enabling statutes setting forth the number of persons
that shall comprise the board or commission. The governor has
the power to fill the boards and commissions so that they are
manned in conformance with article IX, section 5 and so that they
may constitutionally resume their statutory duties.287 To the
extent that the General Assembly determines to enact a statute
that governs, limits, guides, or restricts the governor in exercising
the power of appointment, it may, subject to judicial review, do
279. R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
280. Id.
281. See id.
282. Id.
283. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137-38 (1975).
284. See id.
285. R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
286. Id.
287. See id.
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so.288 But such legislation is not necessary for the appointive
power to be exercised. The will of the people, that the governor
appoint the members of administrative and regulatory entities
administering and enforcing the law, need not constitutionally be
delayed by the deliberations of the General Assembly. 289
CONCLUSION
Although the powers of government are often referred to as
the "legislative power," the "executive power," or the "judicial
288. See, e.g., E. Grossman & Sons v. Rocha, 373 A.2d 496, 501 (R.I. 1977).
289. If article IX, section 5 is not self-executing, a justiciable claim must
arise at some point on behalf of the governor if the legislature continues to
fail to enact the legislation necessary to implement that office's power of
appointment. See Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109
P.3d 257, 265 (Mont. 2005) (Nelson, J., concurring).
Any notion that a constitutionally granted power could be rendered
ineffective by the legislature's failure to enact legislation necessary for its
exercise must be flatly rejected. Id. A non-self-executing constitutional
mandate is, by its nature, enacted with the presumption that the legislature
will act to implement the mandate. Id. Just as legislation that would defeat
or restrict a self-executing mandate of the constitution is beyond the power of
the legislature, "a legislative failure to act upon a non-self-executing
constitutional directive, which defeats or restricts the purpose of that
mandate, is just as unacceptable as legislation which defeats or restricts the
purpose of a self-executing right." Id. at 266. Were that not so, the people's
mandate would be effectively frustrated.
Art. VI, sec. 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution specifically declares
that the "Constitution shall be the supreme law of the state," that "any law
inconsistent therewith shall be void" and that "[t]he general assembly shall
pass all laws necessary to carry this Constitution into effect." R.I. CONST. art.
VI, § 1 (emphasis added). Where the people have adopted a constitutional
provision requiring implementation by the legislature, "it cannot be gainsaid
that the people had the right to expect, and do expect that branch of
government to, in good faith, carry out its constitutionally imposed obligation
to legislate." Columbia Falls Elementary, 109 P.3d at 265.
The state constitution is the mandate of a sovereign people to its
servants and representatives. No one of them has a right to ignore
or disregard its mandates, and the legislature, the executive officers,
and the judiciary cannot lawfully act beyond its limitations.
General Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 862-63 (Mont. 1975).
Indeed no branch of government has, in default of its constitutional
obligation to act, the power to, de facto, write out of the constitution
important rights and guarantees which the people sought to secure
unto themselves, believing when they did so that their elected
officials would, in good faith, honor their command.
Columbia Falls Elementary, 109 P.3d at 266.
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power," each branch of government, and the individuals that have
the privilege of occupying positions in that branch, actually enjoy
a borrowed power - a power belonging to the state's citizens as the
original sovereign. Those citizens have divided the powers of
government and conferred a portion of their sovereign power into
the three branches. "[E]ach branch, in its own way, is the people's
agent, its fiduciary for certain purposes ... [and] fiduciaries do not
meet their obligations by arrogating to themselves the distinct
duties of their master's other agents. '290 Any attempt to assert
legislative control over appointments to the CRMC under either
the public duty doctrine or clause 3 of article I, section 17 would be
a breach of that fiduciary duty to the citizens who enacted the
2004 amendments.
In his farewell address in 1796, George Washington
articulated a principle for those privileged with public office to be
guided by. "[T]he habits of thinking in a free country should
inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration to
confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres,
avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to
encroach upon another. '291 This principle does not sufficiently
animate the House of Representatives' contemplated participation
in and on the CRMC; and the legislation proposed in the 2006
session would violate the state constitution. In the final analysis,
the issues discussed here are not about Democrat versus
Republican, or even legislature versus governor, they are about
implementing the people's will with respect to the distribution and
separation of powers as they have clearly, and forcefully,
expressed it in the state constitution.
290. Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 371, 385-86 (1976).
291. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in JAMES D.
RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
213, 219 (Bureau of National Literature and Art 1909).
